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Given the longevity and vast institutional presence of welfare states in 
 Europe, examining whether they can offer any lessons to the  developing 
world is worthwhile. Clearly, lessons can take the form of negative 
 warnings, as well as positive role models. Because social policy can refer 
to both government actions and the study of those actions, however, two 
types of possible lessons exist: (a) models of social policy action to follow 
or avoid and (b) forms of social policy analysis that help address emerging 
social problems. In an earlier survey titled “Social Security in Developed 
Countries: Are There Lessons for Developing Countries?” Atkinson and 
Hills (1991) concluded that few lessons can be drawn concerning policy 
recommendations, but many arise on the methods of social policy analysis. 
This chapter adopts that general perspective. 
The origins of European social policy are diffi cult to identify. In the 
United Kingdom, modern social policy can perhaps be dated from the New 
Poor Law Act of 1834 and the 1842 Report on the Sanitary Condition of 
the Labouring Population of Great Britain (Chadwick 1965 [1842]). State 
intervention in education and social security came much later. The Prus-
sian state introduced compulsory education earlier, and in 1883, Otto von 
Bismarck introduced the world’s fi rst health insurance program, followed 
by old-age pensions in 1889. Before the onset of World War I, the United 
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Kingdom saw the introduction of old-age pensions, school meals, and the 
fi rst social insurance scheme. By that time, a dense network of local and 
municipal services in health, housing, and social care had reached much of 
Europe also. 
The terms Sozialstaat and Sozialpolitik fi rst appeared in Germany in the 
mid-19th century, almost a century before the term welfare state emerged 
in Britain in the early 1940s. Post–World War II political settlements in 
several Western countries heralded extensive and  comprehensive social 
policies. The emerging national welfare systems frequently replaced or 
displaced cooperative, enterprise, or workers’ welfare provision, while 
extending territorial, socioeconomic, and  occupational coverage in the 
process. Although the shape of social policy differs across countries and 
policy domains, it is a signifi cant feature of Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) states1 in the second half of 
the 20th century. Therborn (1983) defi ned welfare states as those states 
where more than one-half of all government expenditures are  devoted 
to social policy, as opposed to the economy, the military, law and order, 
infrastructure, and other traditional state functions. On this basis, even 
the United States qualifi ed as a welfare state in the last quarter of the 
20th century. 
Given that our focus is European social policy, we must fi rst defi ne 
Europe. Even if we confi ne ourselves to the pre-enlargement European 
Union (EU) of 15 members, we encounter the same problem that most 
 researchers encounter: different “welfare state regimes”  (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 1999) or different “families of nations” (Castles 1993) within the 
EU. Four are generally identifi ed (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000): 
• Liberal: Ireland and the United Kingdom
• Social democratic: the Nordic countries
• Continental: Austria, the Benelux countries, France, and Germany
• Southern: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Thus, Europe is not homogeneous, and its lessons are plural. Indeed, 
 Europe offers a natural and well-studied landscape of differing social 
 policy responses to broadly similar social problems. Because one of its 
more  pervasive lessons is that there are multiple routes to broadly similar 
goals, a major analytical task is to understand the reasons behind these 
 differences. Many studies extend the fi eld of comparison to the OECD 
world of  industrial capitalist states, thus including Australasia, Canada, 
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 Japan, and the United States. This extension compounds the issue of 
 diversity but offers still more variability to enrich comparative analysis. 
This chapter demonstrates that comparative social policy analysis supplies 
a rich set of fi ndings, theories, and hypotheses for the developing world.
Deﬁ nitions, Measures, Problems of Method
Although much research has been done into the development of social 
policy in Europe and the OECD over the past century, for the purposes 
of this chapter one issue that must be determined from the outset is 
the meaning—and hence the measures—of social policy: the so-called 
 dependent variable problem. Following Deacon (2003a), one can 
 distinguish the “three Rs”: regulation, redistribution, and rights. This 
approach immediately suggests three ways of assessing the  extent and 
nature of social policies:
1. Regulation encompasses the major legislation and regulations that 
modify the behavior of private actors to achieve publicly recognized 
goals, justifi ed by some reference to normative values. The private 
 actors can be individuals in households, fi rms and collective economic 
actors, and groups and movements in civil society. This variable 
 suggests a vast scope for social policy, although in practice it is 
 restricted to policies designed to infl uence something directly—such as 
Beveridge’s (1942) “Five Giants”: (a) want (social protection, money 
transfers); (b) disease (health services, both preventive and curative); 
(c) squalor (housing and urban planning); (d) ignorance (education 
and  training); and (e) idleness (employment policies). 
2. Redistribution means the extent to which the state, through taxation 
and public expenditure, redistributes factor or primary incomes in a 
progressive direction. This variable entails measures of public  spending 
and of taxation and other forms of revenue. Although easier to  measure 
than rights, they pose questions of meaning; all else being equal, 
 growing unemployment will result in growing public expenditure on 
benefi ts for the unemployed, and an aging population will result in 
higher pension and health spending. However, these expenditure 
trends may mask stagnation or even reversal in terms of benefi ts, 
rights, or redistribution. Also, as the defi nition of regulation suggests, 
WB66_IS_CH02.indd   41 3/22/08   4:14:16 PM
42 • INCLUSIVE STATES
the state can infl uence welfare outcomes by regulating, mandating, 
taxing, or subsidizing private actors. Social needs can be met by a mix 
of institutions, something more often appreciated in developing 
 countries’ contexts.2
3. Rights refer to the extent to which substantive social and economic 
rights (as opposed to procedural civil and political rights) are guaran-
teed by the state to the entire population (although this guarantee can 
be qualifi ed by residence, nationality, and citizenship). Following T. H. 
Marshall (1950), this variable identifi es the defi ning characteristic of 
welfare states as the use of state-guaranteed rights to counter the power 
of money or political connections. After World War II, full employment 
was recognized as an equivalent economic right in several countries. 
All three Rs have been used as dependent variables in Western social  policy 
research; however, the dominant focus in all three has been the direct role 
of the state. Important exceptions to this general focus include studies 
of  employment policies, where tripartite corporatist arrangements with 
 business and unions often take center stage, and research on varieties of 
capitalism (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001).
Another way of conceptualizing the dependent variable is to distinguish 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes in social policy.
• Inputs refer to legislative inputs, or the expenditure of resources,  whether 
monetary or workforce (such as, spending on social protection).
• Outputs can refer to the implementation of legislation and the  provision 
of specifi c services (such as, coverage rates of social insurance benefi ts 
for designated groups).
• Outcomes refer to the fi nal effects on individuals (such as, poverty, 
mortality, or literacy rates) or on societal distributions (level of 
inequality).
In all these defi nitions, social policy can be studied as a whole or with a 
focus on different policy areas, such as health, education, social protection. 
Some analysts, such as Kasza (2002), argue that researching specifi c policy 
areas is less misleading and avoids aggregating very different entities into 
a spurious overall measure. In contrast, some examples of complementary 
or substitutive effects on welfare outcomes—see Castles’s (1998a) cross-
national study of owner-occupied housing as a functional alternative to 
pensions in providing security in old age—qualify the utility of studying 
policy areas in isolation.
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There is also an understandable search for parsimony. Yet the wider 
the scope of the dependent variable, the greater the research problems, as 
Castles (1998b: 4) observes: 
•  Complex policy processes are rarely likely to have singular determinants.
•  There is no guarantee that the factors infl uencing policy will be 
 invariant over time.
•  There is no reason to suppose that different kinds of policy outputs 
will have the same determinants.
•  Different policy outputs impact on different welfare outcomes in 
 complex ways.
Two methodologies have predominated in this research. The fi rst  comprises 
qualitative, often historical, research on a single country or small-scale com-
parisons of two or three countries. Examples include Heclo (1974) and Weir, 
Orloff, and Skocpol (1988). These works have provided valuable  insights 
into the complex evolution of social responses to changing social  structures 
and the emergence of new social problems. The second  methodology com-
prises quantitative, cross-national analysis over time, across  nations, or 
both. Typically, it involves about 18 nations that are industrialized and rela-
tively affl uent and that have been democratic since World War II; in recent 
years, the previously undemocratic Greece, Portugal, and Spain have been 
added (Castles 1998b). Multiple regression analysis has been a favored 
tool, despite criticisms (Janoski and Hicks 1994; Shalev 2007). The major 
issues with such techniques are overdetermination, with too many variables 
chasing too few cases, and, to a lesser extent, multicollinearity.3 
Stiller and van Kersbergen (2005) provide a useful review of research 
fi ndings. One problem they identify is the interdependence between 
 independent variables and dependent variables. If such variables are inter-
dependent, contrasting theoretical explanations can be validated simultane-
ously. Nevertheless, they and other reviewers appreciate that, over the past 
three decades, comparative cross-national research building on detailed 
single-country studies has yielded a cumulative growth in understanding of 
social policy. The following sections survey some of this research.4
Social Policies in Europe and the OECD: The “Five Is”
Figure 2.1 presents a modifi ed form of a basic textbook model of  policy 
making, based on Easton (1965) and Hill (2003). It fi rst distinguishes 
three explanatory factors: industrialization, interests, and institutions. 
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 Interestingly, these factors were developed in roughly this historical  order 
in the literature. Two more factors are also considered: (a) ideas and 
 ideologies (which can operate both through interest groups in civil  society 
and through governmental institutions) and (b) international  infl uences 
(the original model focused entirely on internal explanatory factors). 
This section summarizes research fi ndings on the effect of the “fi ve Is” on 
 European and OECD social policy.5 
Industrialization and Other Macrosocial Changes
In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant school identifi ed social policy as 
a consequence or correlate of industrialization (Aaron 1967; Cutright 
1965; Wilensky 1975; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). The dependent vari-
able was public social expenditure as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP), and the relationship was demonstrated in time-series and cross-
sectional analysis. Researchers generally agreed that  “economic growth 
and its  demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root causes of 
the general emergence of the welfare state” (Wilensky 1975: xiii; see 
also Mishra 1977; Pampel and Williamson 1989). At an accounting level, 
it would not be  surprising if the share of social expenditure rose faster 
than economic growth (if such  services were superior economic goods) 
or in response to demographic change (if the number of school-age chil-
dren or pension-age elderly rose as a proportion of population). 
Industrialization
Changing
economic,
demographic, and
social structures
Interests
Collective actors,
power resources,
class movements,
and political parties
Institutions
Nation building,
citizenship, states,
constitutions, and
political systems
Ideas
Culture, ideologies, epistemic
communities, and policy
learning
Social
policy
outputs
Welfare
outcomes
International suprastate influences
War, globalization, global civil society, policy transfer, global governance
Source: Author’s diagram, based on Easton 1965 and Hill 2003.
Figure 2.1. A Simple Model of Social Policy Making 
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Nevertheless, several more fundamental explanations have been advanced 
to account for this relationship. The fi rst was based on Talcott Parsons’s 
theory of functional differentiation. As societies developed, new public 
bodies, such as sanitation agencies, health services, and income support, 
would take over the functions traditionally performed by families and 
communities. However, the new social policies did not displace other 
institutions; rather, the decline of traditional forms of provision under the 
pressures of industrialization and demographic change called forth new 
public bodies and responsibilities (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958; see also 
Mishra 1977). This theory is similar to Karl Polanyi’s (1944) account 
in The Great Transformation of the “societal responses” to the social 
upheavals brought about by the “disembedding” of labor markets from 
prior social relations. All these accounts, however, could be, and were, 
criticized as functionalist: that is, as assuming that a new social “need” 
would necessarily be identifi ed and met—and would be met by new pub-
lic institutions. 
Gough (1979) attempted to avoid the charge of functionalism by 
 explaining social policy innovation in the face of capitalist industrialization 
by the centralization of states fostered by rising class struggles.  Rimlinger 
(1971) developed a more comparative and historically informed account 
of industrialization, while still recognizing the ultimate basis of welfare 
policy in Europe as the proletarianization of the workforce and the new 
insecurities faced by this growing class.  Gerschenkron (1962) demon-
strated the advantages of the latecomer in the West, whereby  Germany 
could industrialize faster than the United Kingdom by  benefi ting from 
technological learning, thus providing a systemic argument for why indus-
trialization is not a uniform process. These perspectives all qualify the 
simple industrialization thesis and are returned to later in this chapter.
Demographic transition has long been recognized as a concomitant of 
economic development and transformation. Demographic shifts include a 
fall in mortality and fertility rates, a decline in three-generational house-
holds, and a move to smaller households. Later trends have included 
increased divorce and remarriage and rising numbers of lone-parent house-
holds. Independently, these trends strongly infl uence new social policies, 
from social protection to care services. Yet research by the OECD reveals 
three important caveats to this demographic story. First, these trends  occur 
at widely differing rates across countries. The family in southern Europe, for 
example, exhibits remarkably low rates of fertility, divorce, births outside 
marriage, and single parenthood, and it exhibits signifi cantly high  numbers 
of elderly individuals living with their children (Gough 2000: 131–52). 
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Second, in all countries, the family retains a central role in managing the 
articulation of labor markets and welfare states and in providing care 
work and managing security. The pressures for state-provided or regulated 
 alternatives to the family will continue to build, but their form will differ 
according to the persistence of the household economy. Here, a study of 
Italy and southern Europe could provide useful lessons for the developing 
world. Third, and most important, national social policies are implicated 
in these different demographic outcomes. By enabling or stymieing the 
ability of women and men to combine paid work and child care, they can 
encourage, delay, or discourage fertility; fertility becomes an endogenous 
factor within different welfare systems (Castles 2002).
This discussion leads to the effects of other social structures that stress 
national diversity as opposed to sources of convergence. Two important 
factors here are religion and ethnicity. Since Max Weber and Stein Rokkan 
(see Flora 1999), the importance of religion within Europe has focused on 
the post-Reformation division between Catholicism and Protestantism and 
the subsequent independence from, or integration of, the church with the 
state. The relationship with social policy is not simple; strong links between 
the state and the Lutheran church led to extensive early social interventions 
in Sweden, and by the end of the 19th century, new Catholic doctrines 
of “social capitalism” and subsidiarity fostered different forms of state 
and societal responsibility. The differences between Protestant,  Catholic, 
and mixed religious nations persist. For example, the proportion of the 
 population baptized into the Catholic Church can explain several persis-
tent social policy features, such as social transfers (positive) and women 
working (negative) (Castles 1998b). This fi nding suggests that the infl uence 
of other faiths and related values should feature when one is studying the 
development of social policies across the diverse nations of the world.
The effect of other horizontal differentiating factors, such as language, 
race, and ethnicity, on the development of state welfare has fi gured in 
 historical studies of state building (Flora 1999; Flora and Heidenheimer 
1981). It has also played an important role in explaining the  rudimentary 
welfare statism of the United States in terms of its ethnic and racial 
 diversity (compared with that of industrial European countries). According 
to  Goodhart (2004), cultural diversity—the result of increased migration 
into Europe in recent years—threatens the social cohesion and willingness 
to pay high taxes on which European welfare states depend. A regression 
analysis by Taylor-Gooby (2005) fi nds that diversity does negatively  affect 
social expenditure, but the existence of left-wing politics dramatically 
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 reduces this effect. This fi nding suggests interests and institutions mediate 
the effect of horizontal diversity on territorial social policy. 
Interests: Collective Actors, Power Resources, Democracy, and Parties
Theoretical and empirical critiques of modernization theses were comple-
mented by empirical fi ndings, notably the exceptional trajectory of the 
United States. Those factors gave rise to a second set of explanations in 
the 1970s, which moved beyond macrosocial changes to prioritize the 
collective organization and powers of major social actors, notably  social 
classes. Although this theory is sometimes referred to as the social  democratic 
model (Castles 1978), the label power resources or democratic class struggle 
model (Korpi 1978, 1983) may be more helpful. All such models begin from 
a class-based clash of interests. In an original study of the cross-national 
policy perspectives of labor and business interests in 1881 and 1981, 
Therborn (1986) found (not surprisingly perhaps) labor advocating greater 
state economic interventions, full-employment policies, universal and exten-
sive social policies, and greater fi scal redistribution and economic equality. 
Business organizations favored incentives to growth, private provision plus 
low coverage of social benefi ts, and low redistribution. The hypothesis was 
that the distribution of power resources between the main social classes of 
capitalist society determined the extent, range, and redistributive effects of 
economic and social policies. It is helpful here to distinguish the effects of (a) 
extraparliamentary class-based mobilization and (b) political party systems 
after democratic representation has been established. 
The creation, self-activation, and mobilization of groups of workers that 
 accompanied capitalist industrialization have been featured in many 
accounts of the origins of European welfare states. Proletarian and other 
struggles, trade unions, and socialist parties formed a backdrop to the emer-
gence of national social policies throughout Europe (Gough 1979). In their 
account of the origins of the U.S. New Deal in the 1930s and President 
Johnson’s Great Society program in the 1960s, Piven and Cloward (1972) 
describe how  mobilization by poor and dispossessed groups in the United 
States forced  social concessions from resistant elites. Following World 
War II, the dominant “political settlement” in Europe was an exchange 
of labor’s  acceptance of a capitalist economy in return for the acceptance 
by capital of collective representation and bargaining, social services, and 
social  protection.6 
Nonetheless, after universal suffrage was granted, the terrain of class and 
other social struggles was altered (Flora 1986–87; Flora and  Heidenheimer 
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1981). Interestingly, democratization has rarely been studied as a causal 
factor in the development of welfare states. However, in a study of the 
introduction of social insurance programs before World War I, Flora 
and Alber (1981) demonstrated that absolutist states, such as Bismarck’s 
 Germany, pioneered social policies precisely to sidestep democratization. 
One exception was Hewitt (1977), who demonstrated the  importance 
of the “simple democratic hypothesis” in accounting for country differ-
ences in equality outcomes. When democracy was established, unions’ 
rights were recognized in law, and parties representing  working classes 
and other subordinate interests were permitted to organize, leading to a 
decisive shift in the class balance of power. Working-class organizations 
and parties had more leverage to counter the previously natural-seeming 
demands of business and traditional elites. Within this school, analysts 
placed different emphases on the role of unions and other collective 
organizations, on the voting share of leftist political parties, and on 
parties’ shares of cabinet posts or their role in the executive. Castles 
(1978) stressed the weakness and dividedness of the Right, rather than 
the strength of the Left as the decisive factor. Baldwin (1990) argued 
strongly that class coalitions had been historically important in major 
social policy innovations; for example, urban–rural coalitions are likely 
to result in universalist welfare states. The link between strong trade 
unionism and centralized, neocorporatist industrial relations systems 
has spawned another strand of analysis and explanation. 
Numerous studies have corroborated these two arguments centered 
on interests.7 The upshot is that class struggles matter and politics  matter. 
The industrialization and modernization of Europe and the West did not 
generate welfare states per se; rather, these trends were refl ected in class 
cleavages, class organizations within civil society, their respective  powers, 
their economic and social mobilization, and later, their  parliamentary 
 representation. A crucial factor has been the emergence of ideologically 
based parties pursuing a class-based program of reform in place of  clientelist 
or personalized parties.
Nevertheless, the class-power resources approach could not explain 
the early introduction of social policies by non-class-based parties or the 
 subsequent emergence of strong welfare systems in countries with  relatively 
weak unions and social democratic parties, such as the  Netherlands 
(Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Therborn 1989). Studies also revealed the 
 importance of third-sector provision outside the state and the market—
by religious  organizations and other voluntary bodies. For example, in 
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 Germany and the Netherlands, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and secular 
(and now  Muslim) organizations provide parallel social services. The result 
is a “pillarized” social policy. 
The important but differing infl uence of both Protestantism and 
 Catholicism previously noted was amplifi ed with the founding of Christian 
Democrat parties. Christian Democrat welfare states in Europe provide 
very generous transfer benefi ts, especially to male breadwinners, but with 
a low commitment to full-employment policies and the provision of social 
services (van Kersbergen 1995).
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) infl uential work on welfare state regimes 
 combined the analysis thus far, identifying not two, but three, worlds of 
 welfare capitalism: liberal, social democratic, and conservative or  Christian 
Democratic (see box 2.1).
BOX 2.1
The Welfare Regime Synthesis
Esping-Andersen (1990) elaborated three worlds of welfare capitalism in the democratic 
member states of the OECD, not just the two poles of liberal and social democratic 
identiﬁ ed in the power resources theory. He also argued strongly that social expenditure 
was not an acceptable measure of social policy: “It is difﬁ cult to imagine that anyone 
struggled for spending per se” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21).
The welfare state regime approach instead developed three distinct criteria of wel-
fare capitalism and three sets of measures to complement it. First came the mix of the 
role of states and markets in the production of welfare—to which was added the role 
of households in Esping-Andersen’s later work (1999). Let us call this the welfare mix. 
Second, he posited a new measure of welfare outcomes, which tracked the reality of 
social rights in a country—decommodiﬁ cation. This measure assessed “the degree to 
which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living inde-
pendently of market participation” (1990: 37). In the 1999 book, he complemented this 
measure with the parallel concept of defamilialization; “a de-familializing regime is one 
which seeks to unburden the household and diminish individuals’ welfare dependence 
on kinship” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 51). The third criterion is the effect of these two fac-
tors on the dominant pattern of stratiﬁ cation in a country, measured by the degree of 
segmentation and inequality in different social security systems. These factors provide 
(continued)
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Institutions: States, Constitutions, and Political Systems
In the post–World War II United Kingdom, T. H. Marshall (1950)  famously 
interpreted growing state responsibility as the last stage in the extension of 
citizenship. Civil rights emerged in the 18th century, culminating in the 
1832 Reform Act, followed by the spread of political rights, notably an 
extension of the suffrage, in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The crucial 
third stage for Marshall (1950: 11) was the emergence of social rights in the 
fi rst half of the 20th century: “The right to a modicum of economic welfare 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
Role of Liberal
Conservative-
corporatist
Social 
democratic
Family Marginal Central Marginal
Market Central Marginal Marginal
State Marginal Subsidiary Central
Welfare state:
Dominant locus of 
solidarity
Market Family State
Dominant mode of 
solidarity
Individual Kinship 
Corporatism
Statism
Universal
Degree of 
decommodiﬁ cation
Minimal High (for 
breadwinner)
Maximum
Modal examples United States Germany and Italy Sweden
Source: Adapted from Esping-Andersen 1999, table 5.4.
BOX 2.1
The Welfare Regime Synthesis (continued)
positive feedback, shaping class coalitions that tend to reproduce or intensify the 
 original institutional matrix and welfare outcomes, resulting in strong path dependency.
Esping-Andersen identiﬁ ed three welfare state regimes in advanced capitalist 
 countries with continual democratic histories since World War II: liberal, conservative-
corporatist, and social democratic. He summarized their characteristics as shown in the 
accompanying table.
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and security, to share to the full in the social heritage, and to live the life of 
a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in  society.” The wel-
fare state was the culmination of this third stage and could  reasonably be 
dated in the United Kingdom from July 5, 1948, when the National Insur-
ance Act and the National Health Service Act came into force. Continental 
scholars recognized, however, that this sequence varied across countries; 
Bismarck’s Germany extended social rights to social security precisely as a 
foil to extending political rights. 
Stein Rokkan, in turn, developed a much more extensive theorization of 
the welfare state as a fi nal stage in nation building in Europe (Flora 1999). 
The role of social policy institutions in the building of nation-states and 
welfare states has long been acknowledged (Heclo 1974; Skocpol 1985). 
For one thing, a welfare state requires an effective tax state, as  Schumpeter 
(1918/1991) long ago recognized. In several countries, an overarching 
drive  toward welfare statism occurred, as in Bismarck’s Germany, where 
social insurance in the 1880s provided a social motor to consolidate the 
unifi cation of 1870 and 1871 (Rimlinger 1971). In several federal coun-
tries today, the welfare state can act as a force for unity (Obinger, Leibfried, 
and Castles 2005); when secession threatens, the welfare state can act as 
a lightning rod for articulation of interests and provide compensation for 
socio- and ethno-territorial divisions and inequalities.8 
By the late 1980s to the early 1990s, a new institutionalism had entered 
comparative research into social policy development, notably to explain 
the nature and blocks to reforming and cutting back developed welfare 
systems, as seen in the work of Paul Pierson (1994). This school of thought 
places the nature of the state and political institutions and their patterns of 
development center stage. It largely explains the nature of and variations 
between national social policies in terms of the mediating role of institu-
tions of the state and its policy-making processes. 
Signifi cant differences in state structures and political systems,  however, 
have proved more diffi cult to operationalize and measure to assess their 
 effect in facilitating or blocking signifi cant social policy reforms. Two 
 major strands of thought have emerged. First, following the work of 
 Immergut (1992) and Maioni (1997), research has concentrated on the 
centralization of decision making at the summit of political systems and 
the extent to which the executive is insulated from parliamentary and 
electoral pressures. If power is dispersed and many veto points exist, then 
relatively small and well-organized groups can block the systemic changes 
required to radically reform health or social security programs (see Bonoli 
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2000). Thus, federal systems (see Obinger, Leibfried, and Castles 2005) 
or constitutional  separation of powers hinder the development of welfare 
states—doubly so if both are present. Conversely, parliamentary systems of 
government encourage party discipline and minimize special-interest lobby-
ing. The second strand emphasizes the bureaucratic legacies of past social 
programs—the way that public teachers and health workers, for example, 
or new clienteles, such as old-age pensioners, can mobilize to defend and 
extend social programs and benefi ts (Flora 1986–87; Pierson 2000). 
A combination of these three factors—industrialization, interests, and 
institutions—might now be characterized as the orthodox model of social 
policy in the West (see box 2.2).
BOX 2.2
The Orthodox Model
In an early synthetic and cross-national analysis, Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993) tested 
the effects of state differences on social expenditure, generosity of beneﬁ ts, extent of 
redistribution, and other measures of social rights. They concluded that  constitutional 
structures played an important role in explaining the contrasts between Sweden, on 
the one side, and Switzerland and the United States, on the other. However, they also 
found that the ﬁ rst two factors—industrialization and interests—remained signiﬁ -
cant: all else being equal, aging populations and high-income levels led to higher social 
 expenditure. More important, social democracy strongly inﬂ uenced decommodiﬁ ca-
tion and  redistribution, while Christian democracy fostered high transfer beneﬁ ts but 
also high unemployment.
The model can be summarized as follows:
1.  The development of social policy is determined by all three factors—industrializa-
tion, interests, and institutions.
2.  However, the factors explain different aspects and measures of social policies—the 
dependent variable problem.
3.  Thus, independent variables and dependent variables are interdependent. Stiller and 
van Kersbergen (2005) refer to this ﬁ nding as the matching problem: that cause and 
 effect tend to be speciﬁ ed at different levels of analysis. This problem will  require 
stronger causal theorizing and more sophisticated methodologies in the next 
 generation of welfare state research.
Source: Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993. 
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Ideas: Culture, Ideologies, and Epistemic Communities
The orthodox model however, omits one explanation once common in the 
19th century—the role of ideas and their infl uence on reforming elites. 
Three levels, varying from more to less abstract, are distinguished: the role 
of (a) cultural systems, (b) ideas and dominant ideologies, and (c) epistemic 
communities and policy transfer. 
The infl uence of cultural systems, including religious and other 
 worldviews, on the formation of states and welfare states has been hinted 
at already. For example, Catholic social thinking provided a distinctive 
 antisocialist and antiliberal rationale for public social policies. The  principle 
of  subsidiarity—that policies be enacted at the lowest effective social  level—
not only recognized the crucial role of family, community, workplace, and 
church, but also advocated a signifi cant place for local, regional, and  national 
public bodies (see also Castles 1993). The resurgence of cultural explana-
tions in recent years has occurred partly to explain different  family patterns 
and gender roles within Europe and the OECD. Pfau-Effi nger (2005) rec-
ognizes the relative autonomy of cultural values, yet sees them as alterable 
in the face of basic contradictions, such as the clash between  individualism 
and the gendered division of labor within families and marriage that create 
dependence. Nevertheless, it would be fair to conclude that cultural expla-
nations of policy making are more sophisticated in development studies 
than social policy studies (for example, Rao and Walton 2004).
Culturalist explanations face particular problems explaining policy 
changes, a recurring theme of Hall’s (1989) work on the power of ideas 
in policy change. Hall (1993) later distinguished three orders of policy 
 learning: fi rst order, infl uencing policy settings; second order, infl uencing 
policy instruments; and third order, where policy goals are questioned and 
revised. He applied these orders to explain the rise of neoliberal  thinking in 
the 1970s, which had profound consequences for Western welfare states. 
The Golden Age of postwar Keynesian welfare states was founded on 
 extensive employment opportunities and a complementarity between labor 
markets and welfare systems. This harmony between economy and social 
policy is commonly perceived to have broken down with the challenge 
of monetarism in the 1970s (Mishra 1984). Later, Jessop (1993) claimed 
that Keynesian welfare states were being replaced by the “Schumpeterian 
 workfare state,” although whether as a dominant discourse or as a reality 
was ambiguous. In the 1990s, the discourse of welfare state crisis fused 
with ideas of globalization. These crisis discourses have wide resonance to-
day, although they are undermined by studies that demonstrate the  quiet, 
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incremental adjustments of European social policies to their  changing 
 economic environments.
One notable counteridea is the productive welfare state.  Originating 
in Sweden in the 1930s, this concept recognizes the contribution to 
 modernization and prosperity of good-quality and equitable education, 
health care, population, and family policies. The idea has recently been 
rediscovered with the shift to a postindustrial economy wherein human 
capital assumes central importance and in the new “Third Way” discourse 
(Giddens 1998). Thus, social policies were not and are not solely about 
 redistribution. Some policies, such as early school meals in the United 
Kingdom, have always been perceived as performing a productive public-
good role. In general in Europe, protective and productive welfare states 
have developed together—national schooling and national health systems 
accompanying the development of social insurance and national safety 
nets. Indeed, they are diffi cult to disentangle.
A third school has studied the role of ideas in policy innovation and 
learning through the concept of epistemic communities, defi ned as “a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence and 
authoritative claims to policy-relevant knowledge within a domain or 
issue area” (Haas 1992: 3). Economists provided one powerful  example 
of an epistemic community in the modern world, but social policy 
 experts provide an important alternative epistemic community in most 
European countries. In some writings, this literature fused with previous 
work on policy communities, issue networks, and advocacy coalitions. 
All recognized that learning was an important driver of policy change. 
Both dominant discourses and epistemic communities can be harnessed 
to explain the infl uence of ideas on reform-minded elites and their role 
in framing the options for policy change—preemptive reforms from 
above (Gough 1979: chapter 4). 
International: Suprastate Infl uences on Policy Making
The former accounts all share a focus on the individual nation-state and 
on internal factors explaining the emergence of social policy and  national 
welfare states. Until two decades ago, few recognized that external, 
 supranational factors and agencies played any role in this process, with 
one exception: the impact of war. 
For the most part, World War II has been a taken-for-granted  backdrop 
in postwar thinking on social policy in Europe, but analysts generally 
 recognize that it marked a decisive turning point in the emergence of “big 
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government,” extensive welfare states, and citizenship rights to benefi ts and 
services (Parry 1986). “Total” war required the full  mobilization of  societies’ 
resources, which enhanced both social demands and state  capacities, as 
Titmuss (1950) demonstrated in his study of the impact of World War II 
on the postwar U.K. welfare state (see also Peacock and  Wiseman 1961). 
This infl uence was prefi gured in the impact of the  American Civil War on 
U.S. veterans’ and early federal programs, as Amenta and Skocpol (1988) 
illustrated. Although little comparative analysis exists,  major  differences 
 occurred across nations, between victors and vanquished, and between those 
countries occupied or fought over and those not (see Castles 1998b). 
Elsewhere, the external environment was the postwar settlement of 
the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions. These 
posed signifi cant constraints on economic and social policy making, as 
witnessed in the United Kingdom in 1977, when the government was 
required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cut its budget 
defi cit and social spending. Nevertheless, within this framework,  social 
policies were assumed to be formulated by nation-states with  signifi cant 
autonomy. The importance of transnational and supranational  factors in 
the making of social policy began to be recognized with the  decoupling 
of the U.S. dollar and the move toward monetarist and neoliberal 
 policies in the late 1970s. However, it was the emergence of Eastern 
Europe from behind the Iron Curtain and the discourse and partial 
 reality of  globalization that prompted signifi cant research into the role 
of  supranational factors on the development of national social policies.
It is possible to identify supranational equivalents of all four national 
factors previously described:
1.  Globalization involves relatively unplanned, autonomous supra-
national and interconnected trends affecting the socioeconomic 
 environment of national policy making. Much research in the OECD 
has focused on the effect of increasing economic openness on  national 
social policies.
2.  Global civil society means the organization of interests at a 
 supranational level, including labor, international nongovernmental 
organizations, social movements, and pressure groups.
3.  Global governance deals with the increasing role of international 
governmental organizations, including the United Nations, IMF, 
World Bank, International Labour Organization, World Trade 
Organization, and World Health Organization, as well as important 
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regional associations, notably the OECD and the EU, and powerful 
nation-states, notably the United States and its agencies.
4.  Global epistemic communities are the increasingly interconnected 
policy networks and communities operating at the supranational 
 level.
The chapter will now consider briefl y the effect of the fi rst and fourth  factors 
on European welfare states, although the third is of great  importance in 
much of the developing world.
Economic openness. The term economic openness refers to the growing 
openness of Western economies to trade and investment fl ows, the multina-
tional siting of integrated production systems, and fi nancial deregulation. 
The dominant hypothesized effect on the welfare states of the West was ini-
tially negative: the retrenchment of uncompetitive welfare states—a “race 
to the bottom” in taxation, regulation, state responsibilities, social rights, 
and redistribution (Mishra 1999). More specifi cally, greater trade compe-
tition was predicted to generate deindustrialization and loss of unskilled 
jobs; greater capital fl ows to lead to tax competition, “social dumping,” 
and a reduced bargaining power of states and labor; and fi nancial deregu-
lation to produce a decline in states’ macroeconomic policy autonomy. 
Against this hypothesis, an empirical observation and a counterthesis 
can be made. Identifi ed fi rst by Cameron (1978), the empirical observation 
is that the share of social expenditure in GDP positively correlates with 
openness to trade across the OECD, and this link appears to be growing 
in strength (Rodrik 1998; see also Garrett 1998). The counterthesis, fi rst 
 advanced by Katzenstein (1985) and later more systematically by Rieger and 
Leibfried (2003), explains this fact in terms of reverse causation:  modern 
Western welfare states formed the vital precondition for postwar interna-
tional economic liberalization, because only social policy could assume the 
social protection functions previously provided by tariffs and quotas. In 
democracies, only when national individual rights to social benefi ts had 
been established could governments seriously entertain dismantling trade 
protection and open up domestic markets to foreign competition. 
Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) and their colleagues did one of the most 
in-depth studies on the effect of these factors on Western welfare states. 
 Despite their initial view that economic globalization would impose 
 convergent and downward pressures, the results did not support this con-
clusion. Rather, Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) found that countries reacted 
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differently to common international challenges according to their domestic 
institutions; countries were moving on different employment and welfare 
system trajectories between which there was little transition (see also Bowles 
and Wagman 1997). This fi nding supports Esping-Andersen’s (1999: 165) 
conclusion that in the face of economic openness, “the inherent logic of our 
three welfare regimes seems to reproduce itself.” Another study by  Pierson 
(2001) and colleagues reinforced this fi nding, concluding that external 
 globalization pressures are far less signifi cant for contemporary welfare 
states than the internal pressures of postindustrialism, including aging and 
declining fertility, the switch to service jobs, and family instability. 
As a result, the evidence supporting the negative impact of economic 
globalization on European welfare states is weak. The conclusion, rather, 
is that domestic and international institutions, interests, and ideas  mediate 
economic globalization pressures. This argument has been developed in 
relation to the advanced capitalist countries of the North, notably in the 
work of Swank (2002). Now it is appearing in research into social policy 
reform in the transitional countries (Müller 2002, 2003; Orenstein 2000) 
and the developing world—for example, Mesa-Lago (2000) on Latin 
America and Gough (2001) on East Asia. However, others dispute that the 
weak impacts on powerful Northern states will be replicated, especially 
among small weak Southern states (Deacon 2003b). 
Cross-national policy learning and transfer. Between 1907 and 1908, 
Lord Beveridge and David Lloyd George visited Germany to study the 
new  system of state social insurance; this was a highly visible, but by no 
means the earliest, example of policy learning and policy transfer from 
abroad. Hennock (1987) documents the German precedents of U.K. social 
reform; Heclo (1974) develops the concept of political or policy learning 
and  applies it to the spread of social policy ideas. Hall (1993), as we have 
seen, broadened this concept to social learning. These  concepts have both 
informed and fostered a growing literature on policy transfer: the develop-
ment of programs, policies, or institutions within one  jurisdiction based on 
the ideas and practices of another (Dolowitz with others 2000;  Rodgers 
1998). Such transfers can vary from those imposed by fi at or threat of 
heavy penalties or conditionality, to, at the other extreme, voluntary  lesson 
drawing. Others would emphasize the hegemonic role of dominant ideas 
in a world of unequal actors.9 
One form of policy transfer of growing importance to developing 
countries is the infl uence of international organizations. Here, the West 
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can provide a variety of lessons, including the infl uence of the OECD on 
European welfare states (Armingeon 2004); the infl uence of the EU on 
member states (see, among many studies, Pochet and Zeitlin 2005); and
a comparison of the infl uence of the OECD and the EU on national employ-
ment policies (Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003). These studies may offer some 
lessons for developing countries, but a scholarly  tradition  already exists of 
 studying policy transfer within development studies. In fact,  emphasizing 
policy learning runs counter to the earlier stress on path  dependency. Policy 
transfer is likely more important in the early  construction of social policies 
but is marginalized when institutionalization sets in.
Lessons for Developing Countries
This chapter now briefl y retraces the steps outlined and considers some of 
the immediate implications and lessons for social policy in the developing 
world. Like Atkinson and Hills (1991), it interprets lessons as methods 
of social policy analysis and certain proven fi ndings likely to be of wide 
 applicability. This chapter cannot do justice to the complex issues involved, 
but, in the context of this book, prioritizing social policy scholarship on 
welfare states in Europe seems more appropriate, allowing readers to draw 
their own conclusions on its applicability to the developing world. 
Industrialization and Postindustrialism: Economic and Social  
Conditions and Change
The importance of societal conditions and structural change has been 
underplayed in recent thinking on welfare states and their transforma-
tion, but these issues are central to understanding social policy in the 
developing world. 
National social policies developed in European societies that were  rapidly 
industrializing and came to fruition in the mass deruralization in the  decades 
following the World War II (Esping-Andersen 1999).10 Later research has 
 focused on the new demands placed on welfare states by the subsequent 
stage of deindustrialization, postindustrial capitalism, and the growth of 
the service economy. Today, developing countries can learn  lessons from 
both phases. Industrialization explanations are likely to  remain relevant in 
the newly emerging workshops of the world,  particularly in Asia.  However, 
the growing secondary sector is combined with larger tertiary and primary 
 sectors than were found in European societies in the late 19th and early 20th 
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centuries, with implications for growth,  taxation,  labor  market  security, 
and the applicability of the  European social  insurance model. Above all, the 
pervasive dualism of developing economies—the gulf  between  major cities 
and rural areas, as well as the extensive  spatial  inequalities—is  beyond 
comparison with Europe now and Europe a  century ago.
The demographic transition has accelerated dramatically at  successive 
stages of world development. All projections of its effect on existing  social 
provisions in the developing world—whether schools, pensions, or health 
services—are correspondingly dramatic. However, these projections  assume 
all else is equal, which is precisely what is increasingly questioned, notably 
in the case of pensions, following a World Bank (1994) report. Here the 
lessons drawn from Europe to date have been predominantly negative—
unsustainable social protection programs to avoid. 
The role of families and households in attempting to mitigate risk and 
secure welfare is far more extensive in the developing than in the  industrial 
world. However, two clear and rather unexpected lessons can be derived 
from comparative European research: countries vary considerably in their 
family and household structures and trends, and social policies plainly 
 infl uence this variation. The positive lesson is that Scandinavian-style 
 family programs can ease the combination of work and family life, thus 
enabling more women to work and, all else being equal, reducing child 
poverty rates. Evidence suggests that such productivist social policy can 
also contribute to sustainability by preventing dramatic falls in fertility—
an important positive lesson, especially for fast-developing countries faced 
with rapidly aging populations.
Although a recurring theme in U.S. research and debates, the  effect of 
heterogeneity and homogeneity within countries in facilitating or block-
ing systemic state policies has not been researched in any  systematic 
cross-national way. The evidence from Europe echoes that found by 
Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) when comparing 56 countries 
(including developing countries). They concluded that  ethnolinguistic 
differences alone are not signifi cant in restraining the share of social 
 expenditure, but that racial fractionalization is the most signifi cant  single 
factor. This fi nding suggests that diversity per se is strongly  moderated 
by interests and institutions. 
Interests
In the zones of global accumulation, notably East Asia,  proletarianization 
proceeds at breakneck speed and has fostered unoffi cial trade unions 
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and militant class struggles in uneven ways. Some evidence indicates 
that class mobilization in the Republic of Korea has fueled pressures 
for a welfare state. In such countries, one observes the classic European 
 social  insurance dynamic (Hort and Kuhnle 2000, though see Rieger and 
 Leibfried 2003: chapter 5): social insurance begins with groups of manual 
and factory  workers in large industrial fi rms, gradually rippling outward 
to include  medium and small enterprises; agricultural, white-collar, and 
service  workers; the self-employed; and later, in some countries, even the 
 unemployed and homemakers. Thus, the social insurance state proceeded 
from the strong to the weak. Social insurance offers a built-in transitional 
strategy—the very opposite of today’s dominant target-the-poor approach. 
However, this lesson is less applicable where capitalist development is not 
accompanied by proletarianization and class confl ict. 
Moreover, research on the origins of social insurance and allied  programs 
in Europe suggests that democracy was not a precondition—rather the 
opposite. The Bismarckian strategy has clear parallels, for example, in 
East Asia, where authoritarian leaders have introduced social policies to 
strengthen national solidarity, secure the loyalty of elites, and legitimize 
 undemocratic regimes. However, the democratic class-struggle thesis con-
vincingly shows the importance of democratic organization, though more 
so when allied to the mobilization of class organizations in civil society. 
This, in turn, explains why democratization in Korea may be leading to a 
more inclusive proto-welfare state (Gough 2004). Hence, two distinct les-
sons can be learned from Europe: specifi c state social policies are commonly 
initiated by authoritarian regimes, but democratization changes their form. 
Above all, consistent democratic pressure from below facilitates a move 
from favors, clientelism, and conditional help to meaningful social rights. 
Institutions
The role of welfare systems in extending citizenship as a later phase of state 
and nation building in Europe has been emphasized previously—so, too, 
have national variations in the nature and timing of these  processes. Of 
course, these historical institutionalist arguments have many  parallels with 
the building of nation-states across the modern world: from the develop-
ment of social protection policies in the face of the 1930s  depression in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America, to the ambitious plans for welfare states 
in newly independent former colonies such as Ghana and Sri Lanka, to 
the concessionary social programs to stem revolutionary  pressures such as 
those in the Philippines in the early 1950s. More comparative study of these 
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antecedents and paths—and of the forms of social citizenship on  offer—is 
needed. All these cases, however, presuppose state institutions with certain 
minimal capacities and legitimacy; a welfare state  presupposes a reasonably 
well-functioning state. Where states are failed, “shadow,” or  collapsed, this 
cannot happen. 
The effect of constitutional structures on social policy development is 
diffi cult to discern from research undertaken in the OECD. One strand 
of research in the new institutionalist tradition emphasizes the role of two 
groups created by social programs. First, there are providers:  professionals, 
such as doctors and teachers, and other organized public sector workers, 
together with private sectors, such as insurance and construction. Another 
potential pressure group emerges when social programs appear: welfare 
“clienteles” such as pensioners, tenants of public housing, and so forth. 
One lesson from a comparative study of health care in Europe and the 
United States is that universal social programs and rights are blocked when 
providers and private interests organize ahead of consumers and civil 
 organizations. This lesson is critical at a time when privatization policies 
encourage private providers, giving them an institutional head start over 
consumers and citizens.
Ideas
Being predominantly Christian, Europe provides few opportunities for 
 comparative study of the effect of different world religions on social 
policy development. It is striking, therefore, that the differences between 
 Protestant, Catholic, and mixed Protestant–Catholic countries, and the 
effect of Christian Democrat parties are so signifi cant. This observation 
suggests that current research into the infl uence of faiths on policy in the 
developing world is not misplaced. The emergence of proto-welfare states 
in East Asia, for example, has prompted the study of Confucianism and 
the Confucian welfare state (Jones 1993). Rieger and Leibfried (2003: 261) 
argue that these countries exhibit a “fundamentally different orientation 
to social policy” from the West and claim that “Confucian culture can be 
identifi ed as the fundamental cause of an independent path of welfare state 
evolution in East Asia.” Drawing on Max Weber’s studies of  Confucianism 
and Protestantism, Rieger and Leibfried argue that the distinctive East Asian 
orientation to social policy is “framed” by Confucian values,  although no 
inescapable iron law is at work. 
In connection with ideologies, post–World War II European welfare 
states developed alongside Keynesian models of the macroeconomy and 
WB66_IS_CH02.indd   61 3/22/08   4:14:20 PM
62 • INCLUSIVE STATES
associated ideas of economic planning. Thus, the rise to domination of 
the neoliberal economic paradigm in the 1970s threatened the welfare 
state model, too, and various forms of retrenchment and restructuring of 
 welfare systems were promulgated. In O’Connor’s (1973) terminology, this 
phenomenon has called forth two counterreactions based on  accumulation 
and legitimacy issues. The fi rst is recognition of the productive  contribution 
of social policies through investment in human capital and now in  social 
capital. The second, as the resurgence of interest in Polanyi demonstrates, 
is recognition of the costs of economic “disembedding” in terms of 
 immiseration, exclusion, social dislocation, threats of social unrest, and 
consequent delegitimation of regimes, all of which require and encourage 
new modes of social protection. Examples of both discourses can be found 
in the history of European and Western social policy making.
International Infl uences
The impact of different kinds of war and major civil strife in the  developing 
world is likely to be as important as in the West. Big wars are major  learning 
experiences; if such collective effort can be mobilized for destructive or 
defensive purposes, why can’t the same happen for peaceful, constructive 
ends? Moreover, a plateau effect is likely to occur in state expenditures and 
competencies, which rarely contract to their prewar levels. In  countries that 
have fought major wars, such as Vietnam, extensive veterans’ programs 
and benefi ts exist that can form the basis for more generalized programs. In 
contrast, in territories that provide fi ghting zones for outside forces, such 
as Sierra Leone, almost all indigenous informal agencies and networks can 
be destroyed, resulting in acute insecurity and deprivation. Consequently, 
more research is needed on how different forms of confl ict and wars affect 
social policy. 
Europe offers a valuable lesson on economic openness and social 
 protection. Its open economies (compared with the virtually self-suffi cient 
United States) exhibit more universal and generous levels of social protec-
tion. The statistical association between openness to trade and spending 
on social protection in the West amounts almost to a law. The clearest 
 explanation is that social protection is the only alternative to trade protec-
tion if social disintegration is to be avoided. Yet economic openness does 
not automatically support the emergence and spread of social protection 
systems. In parts of the developing world, the necessary state infrastructure 
has been destroyed by neoliberal reforms promulgated by  international 
 institutions and powerful states. The sequencing in the South is too  often 
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the opposite of that in the North: globalization has preceded welfare state 
formation and previous forms of national economic protectionism have 
been forcibly swept aside before even a rudimentary system of social 
 protection has been put in place.
In terms of policy transfer and learning, Europe’s experience offers 
 ambivalent lessons. Studies of the infl uence of the World Bank and other 
external actors on pension reforms in the transitional countries of Eastern 
Europe have found that, even in such vulnerable states, domestic  interests 
and institutions strongly mediate external policy advice and pressures. 
However, many highly indebted low-income countries in the South will 
lack the power and institutional capacities to adapt international policy 
models to their contexts. Policy transfer imposed by fi at or threat of heavy 
penalties or conditionality is very different from policy learning—indeed, 
they can be mutually exclusive. European countries, with a few time-limited 
exceptions (for example, Germany under the Versailles Treaty), have not 
experienced permanent dependent learning, which represents a novel bar-
rier to the emergence of autonomous social policy in much of the South. 
Conclusion
This brief survey aims to demonstrate the value of studying the lessons 
gained through research on the emergence of European welfare states over 
the past century. Two analytical lessons are clear: First, a  combination of 
structural factors, interest-based mobilization, political institutions, and 
policy discourses has determined patterns of social policy development. 
This fi nding adds weight to Booth and Lucas’s (2004) critique of much 
policy advice and practice in the developing world: that there is a  “missing 
middle”—a clearly specifi ed chain of causation between policy and  intended 
outcome. Social policy must always be embedded in structural, political, 
and institutional contexts. 
A second analytical lesson from European social policy is more con-
testable. It is the importance of path dependency: how, once  established, 
 patterns or constellations of social policies tend to reproduce and are 
 rather impervious to radical change, short of encountering a major  crisis or 
 external intervention. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues this tendency most 
forcefully in his infl uential framework of welfare state regimes, which has 
received considerable empirical confi rmation. In a recent  collaboration 
with Geof Wood and others, I attempt to extend this framework to identify 
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a wider range of “welfare” regimes across the  developing world (Gough 
and Wood, with others 2004; Wood and Gough 2006). In brief, this work 
 argues strongly that different institutionalized patterns across the South 
will also shape the nature and success of different social policy reforms. 
The  implications are that social policy recommendations must adapt to 
 dominant  welfare regimes. It may be argued that  developing countries  today 
are more  constrained by the global environment and face much  greater 
 intervention from supranational institutions—and thus  exhibit much 
weaker path dependency in social policy. However, this conclusion should 
not be assumed, especially at policy implementation level:  scholarship on 
Northern welfare states demonstrates the still overriding importance of 
internal factors. 
Thus, social policy proposals must be contextualized. More  specifi cally, 
they must take account of existing patterns of social provision, the 
 distribution of institutional responsibility, the interests that these  patterns 
express and perpetuate, and the resulting inequalities of power. This 
 observation does not mean that policy learning, transfer, and change  cannot 
occur. Nor does it necessarily reject applying universal principles to policy 
goals. But it does caution against recommending universal  policy designs, 
instead favoring context-specifi c proposals that take account of culture, 
political economies, and inherited institutions. Fundamental social goals 
should be based on an agreed consensus on basic needs or  capabilities, as are 
many contemporary human rights. But “need  satisfi ers,”  including social 
policies, are more likely to be successful if adapted to local  environments 
(Gough 2004).
Notes
 1. This statement excludes recent members and Turkey, a founder member.
 2. Kim (2005) calculates that in the Republic of Korea, total “welfare” 
expenditure accounted for 22 percent of gross domestic product in 1997, 
a fi gure not far removed from the size of the social budget in the United 
States. However, only 9 percent was expenditure by the state; the remainder 
was mostly market spending (7 percent), enterprise welfare (4 percent), and 
family transfers (3 percent). 
 3. Considerably more work has been done on social protection and money 
transfers than on social services in kind. Studying services, such as health 
and social care, encounters still greater problems in identifying the dependent 
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variable and greater intracountry variation attributable to local funding and 
provision. The biggest gap has been the serious study of education policy; for 
recent attempts to remedy this, see Allmendinger and Leibfried (2004) and 
Thelen (2006).
 4. One qualifi cation must be stated about the survey that follows: It does not 
give proper weight to the infl uence of gender issues on the emergence of social 
policies, at all stages of the model. Given their signifi cance in both the North 
and the South, this weakness should be addressed in a subsequent version.
 5. This classifi cation is similar but not identical to the six schools of thought 
of comparative public policy developed by Schmidt (1996), though it was 
developed independently. For a fuller account see Schmidt (2000). 
 6. Paradoxically, the interests and infl uence of business have been little studied 
until recently (see Farnsworth 2004; Mares 2003). 
 7. See Stiller and van Kersbergen (2005) for a good recent survey.
 8. Canada, however, has experienced a decentralization of social competencies 
over the past half century (Banting 2005).
 9. The most systematic account is world society theory developed by Meyer and 
others (1997), in which global cultural and associational processes construct 
dominant worldwide models of reality, resulting in a strong isomorphism in 
institutional arrangements, including social policies.
10. The United Kingdom is the most notable exception to this generalization. As 
the pioneer of both industrialization and deruralization, the country developed 
its social policies at a later stage of these processes.
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